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I
Introduction
In Markman, the Supreme Court unanimously held that in patent
infringement suits, construction of the claims is a matter of law for the
judge, and infringement is a factual matter to be determined by the
trier of fact.' It has been argued that issues involved in claim
construction are not solely matters of law, that if they involve
disputed claim terms upon which evidence is heard, these issues are
inherently and undeniably factual in nature.2 If claim construction
truly presents factual matters, then Markman defies the Seventh
Amendment by summarily determining that factual questions are
matters of law, thereby removing the determination of such questions
from the province of the jury.'
If there is no dispute as to the construction or scope of a claim,
resolution of the issue as a matter of law "could not be otherwise."4 In
such cases, evidence will likely be unnecessary. However, case law
clearly indicates that disputed claim terms become matters of fact in
claim construction, and interpretation of such terms properly
becomes a task for the jury.5 These conflicts imminently require the
1. Herbert Markman and Positek, Inc. v. Westview Instruments, Inc. and Altheon
Enter., Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
2. See Herbert Markman and Positek, Inc. v. Westview Instruments, Inc. and Altheon
Enter., Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 1010 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Newman, J., dissenting).
3. Id. at 1002-1011 (Newman, J., dissenting).
4. Id. at 994 (Mayer, J., concurring).
5. See Tol-O-Matic, Inc. v. Proma Produkt-Und Mktg. Gesellschaft m.b.H., 945 F.2d
1546, 1549-50 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("When the meaning of a term in a patent claim is unclear,
subject to varying interpretations, or ambiguous, the jury may interpret the term en route
to deciding the issue of infringement."); McGill Inc. v. John Zink Co., 736 F.2d 666, 672
(Fed. Cir. 1984) ("If... the meaning of a term of art in the claims is disputed and extrinsic
evidence is needed to explain the meaning, construction of the claims should be left to the
jury."); Perini Am., Inc. v. Paper Converting Mach. Co., 832 F.2d 581, 584 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(observing that "legal conclusions are dictated by established facts and not the other way
around, and does not change the nature of the meaning-of-terms inquiry from one of fact
to one of law"); H.H. Robertson Co. v. Union Steel Deck, Inc., 820 F.2d 384, 389 (Fed. Cir.
1987) ("[I]nterpretation of a claim may depend on evidentiary material about which there
is a factual dispute, requiring resolution of factual issues as a basis for interpretation of the
claim."); Moeller v. lonetics, Inc., 794 F.2d 653, 657 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (holding that "disputes
over the meaning of claim language may raise factual questions reviewed for substantial
evidence or clear error as the case may be "); Palumbo v. Don-Joy Co., 762 F.2d 969, 974
(Fed. Cir. 1985) ("[W]hen the meaning of a term in the claim is disputed and extrinsic
evidence is necessary to explain that term, then an underlying factual question arises, and
construction of the claim should be left to the trier or jury under appropriate
instruction."); Bio-Rad Labs, Inc. v. Nicolet Instrument Corp., 739 F.2d 604, 614 (Fed. Cir.
1984) ("On appeal, [the court] consider[ed] only whether reasonable jurors could have
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judge to make credibility determinations, to weigh the evidence
presented, and to draw legitimate inferences from these facts, all of
which are tasks traditionally relegated to the trier of fact.6
The Federal Circuit's Vitronics decision, which followed closely
on the heels of Markman, held that the use of extrinsic evidence was
improper unless the patent documents proved to be unclear.7 Despite
Vitronics' placement of substantial limits on the potential use of
extrinsic evidence, the court conceded that this evidence could be
used to enhance the technical knowledge of the district court judge.8
However, in a diametric opinion, the Federal Circuit in Pitney Bowes
set forth an entirely new standard for the use of extrinsic evidence in
claim construction. ' Pitney Bowes openly permits the use of extrinsic
evidence in any and all cases0 except to contradict the clear meaning
of the intrinsic documents." This opinion has opened the door to the
admission of extrinsic evidence in support of possible meanings of
disputed claim terms. As a result, it is likely to become increasingly
common for judges to engage in making credibility determinations,
weighing evidence presented, and drawing legitimate inferences from
facts. The increased frequency with which judges will engage in duties
traditionally left to the trier of fact will make it increasingly more
difficult for the Court to argue that claim construction is truly a
matter of law, as Markman demands.
In Markman, the Court dismissed the fact that trial courts would
have extensive opportunities to make factual determinations" ,
although under Pitney Bowes the admission of extrinsic evidence in
association with factual disputes is likely to occur frequently. In
Pitney Bowes, the Federal Circuit has basically mandated that
evidence be taken on disputed issues of fact. 3 Determination of such
interpreted the claim in the manner presumed.").
6. See Markman, 52 F.3d at 1005 (Newman, J., dissenting).
7. Vitronics v. Conceptronics, 90 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
8. Id. at 1583-85.
9. Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(suggesting that "consultation of extrinsic evidence is particularly appropriate ").
10. Id.
11. See Southwall Tech., Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d 1570, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
("Evidence extrinsic to the patent and prosecution history, such as expert testimony,
cannot be relied on to change the meaning of the claims when that meaning is made clear
by those documents.").
12. Markman, 517 U.S. at 389 ("[I]n theory there could be a case in which a...
credibility judgment [would need to be made in choosing] between experts whose
testimony was equally consistent with a patent's internal logic. But [we are] doubtful that
trial courts will run into many cases like that.").
13. Pitney Bowes, 182 F.3d at 1309 (noting that it is "perhaps even preferable, for a
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factual issues would be more appropriately served by triers of fact,
rather than by judges as matters of law. Markman has given trial
judges the authority to make factual determinations on their own,
which "flies in the face" of Seventh Amendment guarantees. 4
Markman may promote inefficiency in the system and effect a denial
of rights under the laws of evidence, "creat[ing] a procedural
quandary, [since] extrinsic evidence can apparently be received, but
no jury can weigh it."' 5
This paper will examine the backdrop against which the Supreme
Court in Markman deemed claim construction to be a matter of law
solely for district court judges, it will explore reasons for which the
Federal Circuit's Vitronics opinion helped sustain Markman, and it
will thereafter explore reasons why the Federal Circuit's recent Pitney
Bowes decision ultimately undermines the Markman holding. Given
the ramifications of Pitney Bowes, it will become necessary for the
Court to reexamine whether claim construction should remain a
matter of law or whether the Court should acknowledge its factual
nature, which would subsequently compel the Court to reexamine
whether or not Seventh Amendment guarantees are being upheld.
II
Background
A. Distinguishing Law and Fact
In defining what "law" is, it has been suggested that
"[d]eclarations of law are fact-free general principles that are
applicable to all, or at least to many, disputes and not simply to one
sub judice.' 6 This means that matters of law, once determined,
should have cross-applicability to other factual situations, essentially
embodying a "general principle or rule, predicated in advance,
awaiting application to particular facts as they may arise."'7
court to consult trustworthy extrinsic evidence to ensure ... claim construction.., is not
inconsistent with clearly expressed,... understandings in the pertinent technical field.").
14. Markman, 52 F.3d at 992 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Mayer, J., concurring).
15. Id. at 1006 (Newman, J. dissenting).
16. Martin B. Louis, Allocating Adjudicative Decision Making Authority Between the
Trial and Appellate Levels: A Unified View of Scope of Review, the Judge/Jury Question,
and Procedural Discretion, 64 N.C.L. Rev. 993, 994 (1986) cited in Markman, 52 F.3d at
1009 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Newman, J., dissenting).
17. Francis H. Bohlen, Mixed Questions of Law and Fact, 71 U. Pa. L. Rev. 111, 112
(1924) cited in Markman, 52 F.3d at 1009 (Newman, J., dissenting).
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On the other hand, "fact" has been defined as:
A thing done; an action performed or an incident transpiring; an
event or circumstance; an actual occurrence; an actual happening in
time or space or an event mental or physical; that which has taken
place .... 'Fact' means reality of events or things the actual
occurrence or existence of which is to be determined by evidence."i
It had been suggested that a fact is something that exists and is
true; that "[a]ll inquiries into truth, the reality, the actuality of things
are inquiries into the fact about them."19 It has been further suggested
"that a controlling distinction between law and fact is whether
evidence is needed, for a question of fact usually calls for proof,
whereas matters of law are established not by evidentiary showing but
by intellectual abstraction."2
The classification of an issue as law or fact, in addition to being
important at the trial court level in determining which matters are
appropriately within the province of the judge and which are to go to
the jury, will ultimately determine the standard of review that the
issue will be afforded upon appeal.21 The level of appellate review has
important implications. If a de novo review is to be conducted, the
appellate court will have to reconsider issues that have been
summarily decided by the trial judge. The appellate court may not
have the benefit of consulting a detailed trial record, particularly if
the trial judge has benefited from a technology tutorial presented by
the parties.22 In patent litigation, the technology can often be complex
and arduous, requiring much more than a typical review of the lower
court's record. 3 The appellate court may need to go to much greater
lengths to gain an adequate understanding of the underlying disputed
factual issues.24 In Cybor v. FAS, the Federal Circuit reaffirmed that
claim construction was to be reviewed de novo in all cases,
emphasizing its classification as a matter of law.25
18. Black's Law Dictionary 591-92 (6th ed., West 1990) cited in Markman, 52 F.3d
967, 1009 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Newman, J., dissenting).
19. James B. Thayer, "Law and Fact" in Jury Trials, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 147, 153 (1890)
cited in Markman, 52 F.3d 967 at 1009 (Newman, J., dissenting).
20. Markman, 52 F.3d at 1009 (Newman, J., dissenting) citing Clarence Morris, Law
and Fact, 55 Harv. L. Rev. 1303, 1304 (1942).
21. See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Tech., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
22. See Markman, 52 F.3d at 1021 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Newman, J., dissenting);
Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1585.
23. See Markman, 52 F.3d at 1021 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Newman, J., dissenting).
24. Id.
25. Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1455 ("We conclude that the de novo standard of review as
stated in Markman [at the Federal Circuit] remains good law.").
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B. Inconsistent Precedent in Distinguishing Law and Fact in Federal
Circuit Claim Constructions
In 1983, the Federal Circuit held claim construction to be a
matter of law requiring determination by the trial judge.26 The court
continued to hold claim construction to be a matter of law,27 although
it deviated from its precedent in 1984 with McGill Inc. v. John Zink
Co., in which it held claim construction to possibly have "underlying
inquiries that must be submitted to a jury."28 In McGill, the court
stated that "if... the meaning of a term of art in the claims is
disputed and extrinsic evidence is needed to explain the meaning,
construction of the claims could be left to a jury."29 Despite this
holding, the Federal Circuit in Markman suggested that its initial
interpretations of claim construction issues as a matter of fact were
not authoritatively supported.3"
1. Claim Construction as a Matter of Fact
Federal Circuit decisions finding claim construction issues to be
matters of fact were issued over a period of eight years. These
decisions were not called into question until they were cast aside in
Markman, which implicitly overruled each one and questioned the
assertion that factual issues arising in claim construction are properly
presented to a jury.2 In such cases, district courts have submitted
disputed issues of fact, upon which extrinsic evidence has been
offered, to juries, and the Federal Circuit has thereafter not applied
de novo standard of review.33 In McGill, the Federal Circuit said that
reversal would only be granted if "[appellant] demonstrate[d] that no
reasonable juror could have interpreted the claim in the fashion that
support[ed] the infringement finding."3 The court stated that
26. See SSIH Equip. S.A. v. U.S. Intl. Trade Commn., 718 F.2d 365, 376 (Fed. Cir.
1983) cited in Markman, 52 F.3d at 976.
27. See Kalman v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 713 F.2d 760, 770-71 (Fed. Cir. 1983);
Fromson v. Advance Offset Plate, Inc., 720 F.2d 1565, 1569-71 (Fed. Cir. 1983); SRI Intl. v.
Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1118-22, 1138-40 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc).
28. McGill, 736 F.2d at 672, cited in Markman, 52 F.3d at 976.
29. Id. at 672, cited in Markman, 52 F.3d at 976; see also Hong Kong Export Credit
Ins. Co. v. Dun & Bradstreet, 414 F. Supp. 153, 157 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Butler v. Local Union
823, 514 F.2d 442, 452 (8th Cir. 1975).
30. Markman, 52 F.3d at 977, referring to Hong Kong Export, 414 F. Supp. at 157;
Butler, 514 F.2d at 452.
31. See Markman, 52 F.3d at 1017-20 (Newman, J., dissenting); see also supra n. 5.
32. Markman, 52 F.3d at 1017-20 (Newman dissenting); see also supra n. 5.
33. See Markman, 52 F.3d at 1017 (Newman, J., dissenting).
34. Id.
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"[appellant] must convince [it] that there is no set of facts, consistent
with [appellee's] interpretation, that was supported by substantial
evidence."35
In Bio-Rad Labs, the Federal Circuit also emphasized that
disputed matters of fact should be considered by juries and should not
be reviewed de novo, similarly suggesting that such matters were
factual in nature, when it set forth that:
Our task is not to interpret the claims as though no trial occurred.
Both parties submitted testimony in support of their interpretation
before the jury. Bio-Rad's interpretation prevailed and was not
overturned by the trial judge. On appeal, we consider only whether
reasonable jurors could have interpreted the claim in the manner
presumed.
In this line of cases, which advocated that disputed matters of
fact were to be presented to the trier of fact at trial, the Federal
Circuit was clear regarding the propriety of submitting factual matters
to juries. The court did recognize, however, that if a term's meaning
was not disputed, it was appropriate for the claim to be construed as a
matter of law.37 Nevertheless, these cases clearly indicate that
disputed terms were viewed in a different light, deserving to be "left
to the trier or jury.,
38
2. Claim Construction as a Matter of Law
There is another line of cases, which holds that claim
construction is a matter of law to be determined solely by the judge.39
The Federal Circuit based its Markman decision upon a perceived
tendency by the Supreme Court to hold claim construction to be a
matter of law for the judge to decide upon", although reliance on
these cases is disputed by the Markman dissent.1 Judge Newman in
his dissent noted that although:
35. Id.
36. Bio-Rad Labs, 739 F.2d at 614.
37. See Palumbo, 762 F.2d at 974.
38. Palumbo, 762 F.2d at 974. See also Tol-O-Matic, 945 F.2d at 1549-50; Perini, 832
F.2d at 584; H.H. Robertson, 820 F.2d at 389; Moeller, 794 F.2d at 657.
39. See Markman, 52 F.3d at 977, citing Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 822-
23 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Intellicall, Inc. v. Phonometrics, Inc., 952 F.2d 1384, 1387-88 (Fed. Cir.
1992); Unique Concepts, Inc. v. Brown, 939 F.2d 1558, 1561-63 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Senmed,
888 F.2d at 818-20; Specialty Composites v. Cabot Corp., 845 F.2d 981, 986 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
40. See Singer Mfg. Co. v. Cramer, 192 U.S. 265, 275 (1904); Market St. Cable Ry. Co.
v. Rowley, 155 U.S. 621, 625 (1895); Coupe v. Royer, 155 U.S. 565, 579-80 (1895); Heald v.
Rice, 104 U.S. 737, 749 (1882); Bischoff v. Wethered, 76 U.S. 812, 816 (1870); Winans v.
N.Y. & Erie R.R. Co., 62 U.S. 88, 100 (1859); Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. 330, 338 (1853);
Silsby v. Foote, 55 U.S. 218, 225 (1853); Hogg v. Emerson, 47 U.S. 437, 484 (1848).
41. Markman, 52 F.3d at 1021 (Newman, J., dissenting).
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Construction of a patent claim is a matter of law exclusively for the
court.... [in] deciding the legal effect of a patent claim, and when
stating the law to be applied by the trier of fact in interpreting
disputed terms. However, it is not correct with respect to findings
of disputed factual issues, issues that usually relate to the meaning
and scope of the technologic terms and words on technical art that
define the invention. Even the majority's selected authority
recognized that such issues are factual, to be found by the jury.
Although the majority now equates these factual findings with
'construction of a patent,' the Supreme Court did not.42
The majority in Markman places reliance upon the patent being
a written instrument, reasoning that the court is better suited to
determine the meaning and scope of the claims as a matter of law.43
When concurring and dissenting judges liken the patent to a contract
for purposes of construction and interpretation, the majority balks,
firmly holding that a patent is not a contract." In so stating, the
majority is unwilling to credit the concurring and dissenting argument
that, although:
Traditionally courts have treated the construction of [contracts,
deeds, and wills] as being a legal question for the court, ... [they]
have stated that under certain circumstances the interpretation of
an agreement may raise jury triable questions. Thus, by analogy....
although claim construction may indeed be a question of law for
the court, it also involves (or... may involve) triable issues of
fact.45
If the majority were to concede that a patent might be likened to
a contract, in accordance with its status as a written instrument, they
would then have to address the two situations in which factual issues
do arise in contractual situations.46 A question of fact may arise in a
contract dispute when "the document may not reflect the agreement
between, or the intent of, the two parties" in which the parol evidence
rule is thereby invoked.47 There is no parol evidence rule in patent
law, thus this situation is not relevant.48 A question of fact will also
arise in a contract dispute if there is an ambiguous term, which often
arises in the patent context.49 If there is an ambiguous term, the parol
evidence rule is inapplicable, enabling the parties to introduce
extrinsic evidence "to demonstrate what the parties intended when
42. Id. (emphasis added).
43. Markman, 52 F.3d at 978.
44. See id. at 985, n. 14 ("A patent... is not a contract.").
45. Id. at 984.
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they used the term. Thus the factual inquiry for the jury in these cases
focuses on the subjective intent of the parties when they entered into
the agreement.
50
The majority discredits the applicability of the situation involving
the factual resolution of a disputed term. They insist that patent claim
language is interpreted, not based on the subjective intent of the
parties, but is objectively based upon "what one of ordinary skill in
the art at the time of the invention would have understood the term
to mean."'" The court goes on to state that "ideally there should be no
'ambiguity' in claim language' to one of ordinary skill in the art that
would require resort to evidence outside the specification and
prosecution history .... [W]ritten descriptions of the invention...
[are] full, clear, concise, and exact."52 The court cites the purpose of
patent specification requirements as, "avoidance of the kind of
ambiguity that allows introduction of extrinsic evidence in the
contract law analogy."53 The court does not suggest that extrinsic
evidence will never come in, as is clearly not the case, although it does
state that "unfamiliarity of the court," and "not ambiguity" of the
terms will usually necessitate the use of extrinsic evidence. 4 The court
finds that the more appropriate analogy to patent claims as written
documents is found in statutory interpretation where "interpretation
is a matter of law strictly for the court."55
The Federal Circuit has clearly created inconsistent, precedent,
which it sought to settle in Markman by ultimately choosing its line of
cases holding claim construction to be a matter of law.56 The Federal
Circuit explained: that the :reason it would thereafter construe patent
claims as a matter of law "as a factual matter is straightforward: It has
long been and continues to be a fundamental principle of American
law that 'the construction of a written evidence is exclusively with the
court."'57 The Federal Circuit expressed concern for predictability and
50. Id.




55. Id. at 987.
56. Id. at 979.
57. Id. at 978, citing Levy v. Gadsby, 7 U.S. 180, 186 (1805); Eddy v. Prudence Bonds
Corp., 165 F.2d 157, 163 (2d Cir. 1947) ("Appellate courts have untrammeled power to
interpret written documents."); 4 Samuel Williston, Williston on Contracts § 601, at 303
(3d ed. 1961) ("Upon countless occasions, the courts have declared it to be the
responsibility of the judge to interpret and construe written instruments, whatever their
nature.").
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accuracy in claim construction, ultimately determining that these
factors would be best preserved by excluding the jury from claim
18construction.
C. Markman v. Westview Instruments - Claim Construction is a Matter of
Law
The landmark case defining claim construction is Markman v.
Westview Instruments.59  Markman sued Westview for patent
infringement of a machine used in the dry cleaning business." At trial,
there was a dispute as to the meaning of the term "inventory" as used
in Markman's patent claim, and an expert testified as to the meaning
of the term before the jury.6' After comparing the patent to
Westview's machine, the jury found that. the patent had been
infringed.62 Before jury deliberations, Westview had moved for
judgment as a matter of law, upon which the judge had deferred
judgment.63 After the jury returned its verdict, presumably Westview
renewed their motion, and the judge proceeded to direct entry of
judgment as a matter of law.' In doing so, the district court
substituted its own construction of the term "inventory" for that
which the jury had given it.65
Markman appealed the district courts action and, after the
Federal Circuit ruled that the trial judge was entitled to make such
determinations, and the Federal Circuit thereafter affirmed en banc,
Supreme Court review was sought and certiorari was granted."' In
affirming the Federal Circuit, the Supreme Court unanimously held
that "the construction of a patent, including terms of art within its
claim, is exclusively within the province of the court."67
The Court basedits determination of claim construction law on
58. See Markman, 52 F.3d at 979 (asserting that to deem claim construction as a
matter of fact would "deprive the inventor of the opportunity to obtain a permanent and
universal definition of his rights ... [and would] subject him to the danger of false
interpretation "); Appellant's Petition for Writ for Certiorari at 21-22, Markman v.
Westview, 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (No. 95-26).
59. Markman, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
60. See id. at 374.




65. Id. at 376.
66. See id.
67. Id. at 372.
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an historical analysis.68 The Court concluded that since judges not
juries, were construing the meaning of written instruments under
English common law, they were likely doing the same in patent
litigation.69 The Court confirmed this by noting that "as soon as the
English reports [began] to describe the construction of patent
documents, they show judges construing the terms of the
specifications. '"70 The Court argued further that its precedent revealed
that construction of patent claims had been a matter of law,
analogizing the construction of intellectual property patent claims to
land patent interpretation, in which judges construe the words.7
The Court also argued that "[t]he construction of written
instruments is one of those things that judges do often and are likely
to do better than jurors."72 The Court notes that claim construction:
[I]s a special occupation, requiring, like all others, special training
and practice. The judge, from his training and discipline, is more
likely to give a proper interpretation to such instruments than a
jury; and he is, therefore, more likely to be right, in performing
such a duty, than a jury can be expected to be.
The Court noted that acceptance of appellant's argument would
"trump" the consideration that must be given to the expertise of the
judge, thereby leaving the construction of the claims to the jury
"simply because the question is a subject of testimony requiring
credibility determinations, which are the jury's forte., 74 Although, the
Court did proceed to acknowledge that credibility determinations
would have to be made about testifying experts, they doubted "that
trial courts will run into many cases like that," making the assumption
that "any credibility determinations [would] be subsumed within the
necessarily sophisticated analysis of the whole document., 75 The
Court concluded its discussion of this matter by giving the jury's
capability to "evaluate demeanor, to sense the 'mainsprings of human
68. See id. at 378.
69. Id. at 381-82.
70. Id. at 382, citing Boville v. Moore, Dav. Pat. Cas. 361, 399, 404 (C.P. 1816)
(involving a judge submitting a question of novelty to the jury only after explaining some
of the language and "stating in what terms the specification runs").
71. See Markman, 517 U.S. at 382 citing Brown v. Huger, 62 U.S. 305 (1859) (holding
that the construction of a land patent was "within the exclusive province of the court.").
72. Markman, 517 U.S. at 388.
73. Parker v. Hulme, 18 F. Cas. at 1140 cited in Markman, 517 U.S. at 388-389.
74. Markman, 517 U.S. at 389.
75. Id. See also Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1463 ("The Supreme Court in Markman stated
that it would be a rare case in which claim construction would turn on an issue such as a
credibility judgment between two competing expert witnesses.").
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conduct, ' or to reflect community standards" less significance than
the judges' "trained ability to evaluate the testimony in relation to the
overall structure of the patent.
77
The Court did not address the argument that claim construction
is "subject to a Seventh Amendment guarantee that a jury will
determine the meaning of any disputed term of art about which
expert testimony is offered., 78 The Court noted that it:
[N]eed not decide either the extent to which the Seventh
Amendment can be said to have crystallized a law/fact distinction,
or whether post-1791 precedent classifying an issue as one of fact
would trigger the protections of the Seventh Amendment if (unlike
this case) there were no more specific reason for decision.
79
In so concluding, the Court leaves open the question of whether
rights guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment might be infringed as a
result of its decision. This issue will almost surely have to be revisited.
The Supreme Court thereafter sets forth that claim construction
is a matter of law to be determined by district court judges because
"uniformity in the treatment of a given patent" is important."' The
Court opines that without uniformity, the uncertainty of patentees in
their patent rights would ultimately discourage invention," and states
that:
Uniformity would... be ill served by submitting issues of
document construction to juries. Making them jury issues would
not, to be sure, necessarily leave evidentiary questions of meaning
wide open in every new court in which a patent might be litigated,
for principles of issue preclusion would ordinarily foster
uniformity.
Despite the Court's embracing of this "uniformity" concept, it
goes on to realize that:
[I]ssue preclusion could not be asserted against new and
independent infringement defendants even within a given
jurisdiction, treating interpretive issues as purely legal will promote
(though it will not guarantee) intrajurisdictional certainty through
the application of stare decisis on those questions not yet subject to
interjurisdictional uniformity under the authority of the single
76. Commr. v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 289 (1960) cited in Markman, 517 U.S. at
389.
77. Markman, 517 U.S. at 389-90.
78. Id. at 372.
79. Id. at 384, n. 10.
80. Id. at 390.
81. Id. referring to United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 236
(1942); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 369 (1938).
82. Markman, 517 U.S. at 391.
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appeals court."
The Court's realization indicates that issue preclusion may not
carry the sense of uniformity it had noted, raising doubt as to the
strength of this argument.
As the current law on claim construction, Markman has 'forced
District courts to develop procedures by which they will construe
patent claims, and accordingly the Northern District of California has
addressed the matter in its Civil Local Rules.84 Markman has also
placed the burden of de novo review on the Federal Circuit for all
patent 'cases appealed on the basis of :claim construction, which could
prove to be a daunting task.85
D. Extrinsic Evidence in Claim Construction
1. Vitronics v. Conceptronics
The same year as the Supreme Court's unanimous Markman
decision, the Federal Circuit in Vitronics set the standard for the use
of extrinsic evidence in claim construction.86 After Markman there
was no question that extrinsic evidence may sometimes be presented
to educate judges on the technical aspects involved in litigation,
although there was some question as to the degree to which extrinsic
evidence, would need to be -used to construe claim terms and their
scope.87 The Federal Circuit indicated that, "ideally" the claims would
not be ambiguous, so they did not envision extensive use of extrinsic
evidence for the purpose of construing claims.' However, case law
indicates that there are often disputes as to the meaning of claim
terms and their scope.89
The Federal Circuit in Vitronics was clear that "in interpreting an
asserted claim, the court should look first to the intrinsic evidence of
record, i.e. the patent itself, including the claims, the specification
and, if in evidence, the prosecution history, ' The court deemed
"[s]uch intrinsic evidence [to be] the most significant source of the
83. Id.
84. Civil L.R. 16-10 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (entitled "Claim Construction Proceedings in
Patent Cases").
85. Markman, 52 F.3d at 1021, n. 11 (Newman, J., dissenting); Cybor, 138 F.3d at
1455.
86. Markman, 517 U.S. at 370; Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1576.
87. Markman, 52 F.3d at 986.
88. See id.
89. See supra n. 5.
90. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582, cited in Markman, 52 F.3d at 979.
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legally operative meaning of disputed claim language."91 In so stating,
the Federal Circuit basically admitted that claims would not be as
clear as they propose. The court concedes that disputes will arise, but
they designate the intrinsic patent evidence to be most valuable in
resolving such disputes, indeed as being "the single best guide to the
meaning of a disputed term." The court ultimately resolves that "[i]n
those cases where the public .record unambiguously describes the
scope of the patented invention, reliance on any extrinsic evidence is
improper."93 Despite the apparent prohibition on the use of extrinsic
evidence if the patent. documents are unambiguous, the Federal
Circuit does reserve that such evidence is permissible to provide a
background in the relevant technology for the court.94
2. Pitney Bowes v. Hewlett-Packard
The Federal Circuit's most recent decision regarding the use of
extrinsic evidence in claim construction turned Vitronics on its head.9
Vitronics clearly set forth that the use of extrinsic evidence was to be
limited.96 Pitney Bowes provided an entirely new standard for the
admission of extrinsic evidence in claim construction, and for all
intents and purposes repudiated Vitronics. It is notable that the
majority opinions in Vitronics and Pitney Bowes were both written by
Judge Michel, yet they are in direct contradiction to one another.
In Pitney Bowes, Judge Michel stated that, "Vitronics does not
prohibit courts from examining extrinsic evidence, even when the
patent document is itself clear."97 He further asserted that, "Vitronics
does not set forth any rules regarding the admissibility of expert
testimony into evidence. Certainly, there are no prohibitions in
Vitronics on courts hearing evidence from experts."98 Ultimately
resolving that "under Vitronics, it is entirely appropriate, perhaps
even preferable, for a court to consult trustworthy extrinsic evidence
to ensure that the claim construction it is tending to from the patent
file is not inconsistent with clearly expressed, plainly apposite, and
91. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582 (emphasis added).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1583. Also note that although the court may not think there is any
ambiguity in the claim terms, the parties may dispute the meaning of those terms and that
in and of itself would cause the term to become a disputed fact.
94. See Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1585.
95. Pitney Bowes, 182 F.3d at 1298.
96. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1583.
97. Pitney Bowes, 182 F.3d at 1308.
98. Id.
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widely held understandings in the pertinent technical field."'9
Judges Rader and Plager concurred in the Pitney Bowes opinion
and suggested that, "[a]ppellate courts can err by giving too much
guidance."' '° Although Judge Michel opined that Vitronics "[did] not
set forth any rules regarding the admissibility of expert testimony into
evidence,"'' 1 it is abundantly clear that judges and practitioners alike
interpreted Vitronics as setting forth a standard of limited
admissibility of extrinsic evidence in claim construction. 2 The
concurring judges realized that "[i]n assessing the reliability of
evidence,.., rarely can distant appellate hindsight improve upon the
immediate and informed judgment of the trial judge.""1 3
The concurring judges also suggested that "no strict, uniform
rules can anticipate every variable in assessing complex technical
evidence. 'Too much depends upon the particular circumstances of
the particular case at issue.""' 4 In Kumho Tire, the Supreme Court
asserted that "the trial judge must have considerable leeway in
deciding how to go about determining whether particular expert
testimony is reliable."'0 5 This suggests that a district court judge, in
hearing the testimony of experts, may not merely be gathering
technical information, but most likely is engaging in credibility
determinations and weighing of evidence.
The concurrence ultimately, concluded that although Vitronics
condemned -reliance upon expert testimony, "this... discounted the
relevance and helpfulness of testimony from experts skilled in the art
to determine the meaning of the claims."'0 6 Judges Rader and Plager
"applaud" the Federal Circuit's "restate[ment of] the role of expert
testimony" and the trust that they place in district court judges'
99. Id. at 1309.
100. Id. at 1314 (Rader and Plager, JJ.; concurring).
101. Id. at 1308.
102. See Bell & Howell Doc. Mgt. Prods. Co. v. Altek Sys., 132 F.3d 701, 706 (Fed. Cir.
1997) ("Use of Expert testimony to explain an invention may be useful. But reliance on
extrinsic evidence to interpret claims'is proper only when the claim language remains
genuinely ambiguous after consideration of the intrinsic evidence"); see also James B.
Altman et al., The Law of Patent Claim Interpretation: The Revolution Isn't Finished, 8
Fed. Cir. B.J. 93, 103 (1998) ("Vitronics has been read to encourage judges to ignore [the
understanding of experts skilled in the art at the time the invention was patented] so long
as the court thinks that the patent documents are clear.").
103.. Pitney Bowes, 182 F.3d at 1314 (Rader and Plager, JJ., concurring).
104. Id. (Rader and Plager, JJ., concurring), citing Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526
U.S. 137, 150 (1999).
105. Kumho, 526 U.S. at 152.
106. Pitney Bowes, 182 F.3d at 1314 (Rader and Plager, JJ., concurring).
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abilities to "[assess] the reliability of expert testimony."1 7 Pitney
Bowes ultimately condoned the admission of expert testimony to:
(1) supply a proper technological context to understand the claims
(words often have meaning only in context), (2) explain the
meaning of claim terms as understood by one of skill in the art (the
ultimate standard for claim meaning), and (3) help the trial court
understand the patent process itself (complex prosecution histories
- not to mention specifications - are not familiar to most trial
courts) 108
Under Pitney Bowes, it is proper for expert testimony to be
considered, even if the internal patent documents appear clear, in
order to assist the judge in gaining a better understanding of the




A. Claim Construction is More Properly a Matter of Fact
1. Federal Circuit Precedent Supports Claim Construction as a Matter of
Fact
Before the Federal Circuit arrived at its conclusion in Markman,
its precedent was extremely inconsistent."' With this in mind, the
court could have argued for application of either its line of precedent
classifying claim construction as law or as fact. The court strongly
held in many cases that disputed claim terms, calling for further
explanation through the use of extrinsic evidence, were properly
within the province of the jury."' Alternatively, the court held,
consistently with Markman, that claim construction was a matter of
law to be determined in all cases by the district court judge."2 The
court based its decision to consider claim construction as a matter of
law on a historical analysis, in addition to the fact that patents are
107. Id. at 1315.
108. Id. at 1314.
109. Id. at 1309, 1314.
110. Markman, 51 F.3d at 979.
111. Seesupra n. 5.
112. See Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 822-23 (Fed. Cir. 1992); -Intellicall,
Inc. v. Phonometrics, Inc., 952 F.2d 1384, 1387-88 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Unique Concepts, Inc.
v. Brown, 939 F.2d 1558, 1561-63 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Senmed v. Richard-Allan Med. Indus.,




written instruments,"3 although the court's reasoning appears to be
somewhat tenuous.
The Federal Circuit refused to admit that a patent is similar to a
contract, although they have some difficulty distinguishing the two.
The court asserts that "contracts... contain promises that must be
performed" and patents contain promises that "[have] been fully
executed" once the patent is issued. 114 Although the majority seeks to
base its entire argument on the fact that a patent is written, the mere
fact that a patent does not invoke additional promises from the
government, is not persuasive in distinguishing it from a contract. The
argument is not strengthened by the court's further assertion that
"patent infringement suits have never been viewed as breach of
contract actions." '115 A patent infringement suit is typically brought
against a private party, not the government, from which the patentee
has received the patent rights. In this scenario, the accused infringer is
not a party to the contract between the patentee and the government.
The court asserts that a "competitor does not breach this contract
between the government and the inventor by making, using, or selling
the accused devices.".. 6 Once again, the competitor is not a party to
the contract between the government and the patentee, and would be
incapable of breaching the contract.
The court set forth no further reasons for which a patent should
not be considered a contract, and by summarily dismissing this
argument, avoids the circumstance under which an ambiguous term
would raise a question of fact under contract analysis.11 7 The court
avoids confrontation of the opposing argument's truism, which would
thrust the issue of claim construction into the realm of fact, rightfully
demanding presentation to the jury for determination.
2. Factual Matters Should Not be Relabeled as Matters of Law
Issues that are clearly factual, compelling an inquiry into the
truth about them,"' should not be reclassified as issues of law. It has
been suggested that "the appellate assertion of power to treat fact as
law [is] 'drastic in that it amounts to a direct judicial assault on the
113. Markman, 52 F.3d at 978.




118. See James B. Thayer, "Law and Fact" in Jury Trials, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 147, 153
(1890) cited in Markman, 52 F.3d at 1009 (Newman, J., dissenting).
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prerogatives of fact finders."' "19
Common sense dictates that by allowing experts to testify as to
the meaning of disputed claim terms, the court will inherently have to
weigh evidence and make credibility determinations regarding
testimony. In weighing this evidence district court judges will
naturally engage in drawing logical inferences from the testimony
presented, in an attempt to align it with the internal documents. The
Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court maintain that these tasks can
be accomplished by the judge as a matter of law, although this seems
to defy the role of the jury in patent cases. Triable issues of fact
typically go to the jury for their determinations as to credibility of the
evidence, weight to be given to the evidence, and logical inferences to
be drawn in determining the truth or falsity of the evidence
presented. These tasks are equivalent to those being undertaken by
the judge in claim construction, which suggests that the court is
overstepping its procedural bounds.
In petitioning the Court for certiorari, Petitioner asserted that
the district court judge, in directing the verdict, "weighed the
evidence [and] evaluated [its] credibility."'2 ° The Federal Circuit
conceded this and determined that the judge would be allowed to
engage in such activities, despite their typical reservation for the trier
of fact.21 In determining claim construction to be a matter of law in all
cases, the Federal Circuit clarified that its holding would stand "even
if 'extrinsic' evidence' - including live 'expert and inventor testimony'
- is necessary to determine the meaning of the patent.' ' 22 In other
words:
[W]hatever formula is used to describe the consideration of this
evidence, the district court judge actually will decide the weight of
the evidence and credibility and demeanor of witnesses in resolving
this supposed issue of law.... This result flows from a change of
labels divorced from substance: the factual dispute merely is
relabelled [sic] a question of law.
123
Petitioner suggests that district court judges are interpreting
claim terms, which are properly within the realm of the jury, and that
119. Markman, 52 F.3d at 1008 (Newman, J., dissenting) citing Martin B. Louis,
Allocating Adjudicative Decision Making Authority Between the Trial and Appellate
Levels: A Unified View of Scope of Review, the Judge/Jury Question, and Procedural
Discretion, 64 N.C. L. Rev. 993, 994 (1986).
120. Appellant's Petition for Writ for Certiorari at 5, Markman v. Westview, 52 F.3d
967 (Fed. Cir. 1995).




these disputed issues of fact can not simply be redefined as matters of
law.'24 Consideration of factual matters as law has been referred to as
an exercise in "semantics, [where] our choice of words does not
always reflect the magic we would prefer to ascribe to them.'
' 25
Judge Newman, in dissent of the Federal Circuit's Markman
decision, strongly urges that "[t]he subject matter that the majority
now designates as 'law' - the disputed meaning and scope of
technologic terms and words of art as used in particular inventions -
is not law, but fact." Judge Newman argues that there can be no
question as to the factual nature of the determination being made
regarding the term "inventory" in Markman .1 6 The meaning of
"inventory" is clearly not a matter of law, but an issue of fact, as its
meaning is "specific to this invention, this patent, this claim, this
system, this defendant. Its determination is for the trier of fact."'27 In
this case, it seems clear that a factual matter has been arbitrarily
reclassified as a matter of law, essentially removing the jury from
determination of facts that are essential to the final outcomes of
patent infringement actions.
128
The role of the jury should be respected. Factual matters should
not be removed from the province of the jury.'29 In the past, it has
rarely been questioned that determinations regarding the weight and
credibility of the evidence "are for the jury, whether the issues are
technologic, scientific, or otherwise."'3 ° The jury is presumed to be
well suited to determine the weight and credibility of testimony
because of their "natural intelligence and their practical knowledge of
man and the ways of man; and so long as we have jury trials they
should not be disturbed in their possession of it, except in a case of
manifest and extreme abuse of their function."' 3 Additionally, it has
been argued that the Supreme Court's conclusion in Markman,
designating judges as better suited to construing claims in patent
litigation due to the complexity of the evidence, "was a perilous
124. See id.
125. Markman, 52 F.3d at 1009 (Newman, J., dissenting).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1010.
128. See Appellant's Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6, Markman v. Westview, 52 F.3d
967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (emphasis in Judge Mayer's Dissent that "infringement often turns on
how the patent is interpreted").
129. See Sartor v. Ark. Nat. Gas Corp., 321 U.S. 620 (1944), construed in Markman, 52
F.3d at 1007.
130. Id.
131. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 140 U.S. 76, 88 (1891), cited in Markman, 52 F.3d at
1007.
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decision of last resort." '132 Furthermore, it is improper to discredit the
capability of juries:
For juries regularly render verdicts in civil cases based on complex
forensic and documentary evidence of equal or greater difficulty
than seen in patent cases. And the implications under Article III
and the Sixth Amendment are even more profound. Increasingly
complex cases involving scientific and complicated documentary
evidence are presented to criminal juries which, of course, decide
matters of life and liberty, not merely money."'
The importance of the jury's role in factual determinations
necessitates that such issues remain as matters of fact and should not
be reclassified as matters of law."3 This concept has been described in
the following way: "In the concert hall of justice, each musician has a
part to play. When one on whim plays not his own part, but another's
part, discord is certain.""' This description seems to capture the very
essence of a properly functioning judicial system, in which factual
issues remain as such, escaping reclassification as matters of law.
Additionally, in making its decision, it appears that the Federal
Circuit did not fully explore the method by which they would obtain
the necessary technological facts for appellate review.' In dissent,
Judge Newman asked:
Are we to read the entire record of the trial, re-create the
demonstrations, decipher the literature of the science and art; are
we to seek our own expert advice; must the parties be told the
technical training of our law clerks and staff attorneys? No amicus
explained how improved technological correctness - that is, truth -
would be more likely to be achieved during the appellate process of
page-limited briefs and fifteen minutes per side of argument.1
7
When triable issues of fact arise, the parties as well as the court
would benefit from these issues being properly classified as factual
matters, deserving of determination by the trier of fact.
B. Vitronics' Perceived Prohibition of Experts Provided Sustenance for
Markman
In effect, Vitronics helped sustain the Supreme Court's assertion
in Markman that claim construction was purely a legal matter to be
132. Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1464 (Mayer and Newman, JJ., concurring).
133. Id.
134. See Appellant's Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 12, Markman v. Westview, 52
F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("Relabelling [sic] a factual dispute as a legal question in 1995
cannot escape the Seventh Amendment.").
135. R.R. Dynamics, Inc. v. A. Stucki Co., 727 F.2d 1506 (1984), cited in Markman, 52
F.3d at 1007.
136. See Markman, 52 F.3d at 1021, n. 11.
137. Id.
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determined by the judge. Leaving aside for the moment the central
argument that disputed claim terms are more properly issues of fact
rather than law and conceding that claim construction is held to be a
matter of law, Vitronics was vital to the sustenance of this holding.
In setting forth limitations on the admission of expert testimony
and other extrinsic evidence, Vitronics made it appear as though there
would be few occasions on which judges would actually be called
upon to make factual determinations in the process of claim
construction.'38 In indicating that "ideally" the claims would not be
ambiguous, the Federal Circuit questioned that disputes requiring
extrinsic evidence would be prevalent.39 Vitronics supported the
Markman holding since the Court assumed that district court judges
would primarily be dealing with matters of law in claim
construction.
C. Pitney Bowes Calls the Markman Holding into Question
1. Admitting Extrinsic Evidence Will Inevitably Lead to Factual
Determinations
Judge Michel's turnabout from Vitronics to Pitney Bowes
conceivably undermines the Markman holding. Vitronics' limitation
on the admissibility of extrinsic evidence theoretically had the effect
of excluding matters of fact from claim construction. Under Pitney
Bowes, district courts have much more freedom to assess extrinsic
evidence in construing patent claims. 4'
The practical effects of the Pitney Bowes standard for admission
of extrinsic evidence is not yet apparent, although it seems as though
the ease with which such evidence may now be admitted will result in
a significant increase in the use of extrinsic evidence in claim
constructions. The potential increase in extrinsic evidence will
undoubtedly lead to more factual disputes, which will in turn lead to
rampant commandeering of factual determinations as matters of law.
These determinations are more appropriately within the province of
the jury as finders of fact.
138. See Markman, 52 F.3d at 986.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Pitney Bowes, 182 F.3d at 1309 (finding that "it is entirely appropriate, perhaps
even preferable, for a court to consult ... extrinsic evidence").
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2. The Distinction between Educational and Evidentiary Expert Testimony
is Illusory
Vitronics distinguished between the use of expert testimony to
merely educate the district court judge and its use in actual
construction of the claims.42 In practice, the evidence presented by
experts during claim construction is not evidence of record if
concealed within a tutorial session."'. The evidence, although often
not claimed to be such, is frequently presented to the judge by way of
an educational presentation, which can be jointly created by the
parties."' This is done in an attempt to give the judge a better general
understanding of the technology underlying the patent in suit.
Undoubtedly, although the parties work together in preparing the
presentation for the court, one party is not going to allow information
to be presented that may be perceived as biased, thus the information
is likely to be balanced. Although the tutorials are not supposed to
provide an additional forum for argument of any disputed claim
terms, discussion of such terms in some regard may be unavoidable in
providing a general technological background.
Experts and inventors are sometimes used to help explain the
underlying technology to the court. Through this process, it is possible
that district court judges will be simultaneously aided in
interpretation of the claims, as this seems unavoidable. 14 "As a matter
of logic, [the sole use of the testimony for educational purposes] is
difficult to grasp.' 16 Federal Circuit Judges Mayer and Newman have
inquired:
What is the distinction between a trial judge's understanding of the
claims and a trial judge's interpretation of the claims to the jury?
Don't judges instruct the jury in accordance with their
understanding of the claims? In practice, how does this court's lofty
appellate logic work? As this court acknowledges, a trial court must
often resort to experts to learn complex new technologies. What
happens when the learning influences a trial judge's interpretation
of the claim terms? Are trial judges supposed to disguise the real
142. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1585 ("Had the district court relied on the expert testimony
and other extrinsic evidence solely to help it understand the underlying technology, we
could not say the district court was in error.").
143. Id.
144. The information presented in tutorials is typically general background of the
underlying technology of the patent in suit. However, it appears that this neutral
presentation, may inadvertently present information to the judge which, in combination
with the information previously gained through the parties' briefs, may incline the judge to
begin to preliminarily weigh evidence and make inferences (associated with the any
disputed claims) which may properly be gleaned from the tutorial session's content.
145. See Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1474 (Mayer and Newman, JJ., dissenting).
146. Id.
2001]
reasons for their interpretation? How will this perverse incentive to
'hide the ball' improve appellate review?
14
Testimony presented in a technology tutorial may too frequently
leave the judge in a position of determining credibility, weighing
evidence, and drawing logical inferences from evidence presented.
Arguably, even under Vitronics, the Court's holding in Markman is
precarious. The extensive use of technology tutorials, as well as
evidence permitted to explain disputed claim terms, clearly sets the
stage for district court judges to make a multitude of factual
determinations148
D. Construing Claims as a Matter of Law Fails to Recognize Seventh
Amendment Guarantees
Classifying issues arising under claim construction as matters of
law, essentially usurps patent litigants' Seventh Amendment
guaranteed rights and "trivializes" the United States' heritage of
preservation of the right to trial by jury. 49 For two hundred years,
patent infringement suits have been tried to juries in the United
States.5 Judge Newman, in dissent of the Federal Circuit's opinion in
Markman, argues that, "[w]hatever version of 'law/fact' this court
now chooses to adopt, it can not redact the history of jury trials. The
judicial obligation to safeguard the constitutional right is not
defeasible by calling a patent a 'statute,' or otherwise diminishing the
vitality of the Seventh Amendment."' 5' The Seventh Amendment
assures that:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall
exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved,
and no fact tried by a jury, shall otherwise be re-examined in any
Court of the United Stated, than according to the rules of the• 152
common law.
In fashioning the Seventh Amendment, the framers felt that it set
forth an important right that was not to be taken lightly.'53 Alexander
147. Id. at 1474-75.
148. See Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1464 (Mayer and Newman, JJ., dissenting) ("The Supreme
Court recognized that in some cases there will be conflicting evidence that has to be
resolved - where there are factual determinations that are more than just incident to claim
construction - such as the understanding of one skilled in the art at the time the patent
application was filed. In these cases, all that Markman stands for is that the judge will do
the resolving, not the jury.").
149. Markman, 52 F.3d at 1011 (Newman, J., dissenting).
150. See id. at 1010.
151. Id.
152. U.S. Const. amend. VII.
153. See The Federalist No. 83, at 499 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) cited in Markman,
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Hamilton regarded the right to trial by jury in civil cases "as a
valuable safeguard to liberty" and "as the very palladium of free
government." 5 ' Hamilton's statements were emphasized in Dimick v.
Schiedt when the Supreme Court set forth that "[m]aintenence of the
jury as a fact-finding body is of such importance and occupies so firm
a place in our history and jurisprudence that any seeming curtailment
of the right to a jury trial should be scrutinized with the utmost
care.
,55
It has become generally accepted that "the court shall not
assume directly or indirectly to take from the jury [issues properly
determined by the trier of fact]" 156 and that "[s]o long as the Seventh
Amendment stands, the right to a jury trial shall not be rationed." ' 7
"When two experts testify differently as to the meaning of a technical
term, and the court embraces the view of one, the other, or neither
while construing the patent claim as a matter of law, the court has
engaged in weighing evidence and making credibility
determinations." '158 In such an instance, the court is clearly impinging
upon duties that are properly left to the trier of fact.
Additionally, there seems to be no reason to treat patent cases
separately from other civil cases arising under the law and the
applicable rules of procedure, despite the Markman majority's
holding to the contrary."9 Ultimately, attempts to segregate patent
cases from the guarantees of the Seventh Amendment have been
characterized as "egregious" in their disregard of "the jury right in
patent cases." ' 6 In petitioning the Supreme Court for certiorari,
appellants in Markman argued that:
The Seventh Amendment does not permit abridging the right to
jury trial because of some perceived advantage of decision by the
judge rather than the jury.... [Clonsiderations [of predictability
and accuracy] reflect a lack of confidence in juries not shared by the
framers of the Constitution. Even on their own terms, however,
they are without merit.
1 61
52 F.3d at 1010 (Newman, J., dissenting).
154. Id.
155. Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935) cited in Markman, 52 F.3d at 1010
(Newman, J., dissenting).
156. Walker v. N.M. & S. P. R.R. Co., 165 U.S. 593, 596 (1897) cited in Markman, 52
F.3d at 1011 (Newman, J., dissenting).
157. Markman, 52 F.3d at 1011(Newman, J., dissenting).
158. Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1475 (Rader, J., dissenting).
159. See Markman, 517 U.S. at 391.
160. Markman, 52 F.3d at 1010; see also Appellant's Petition for Writ for Certiorari at
8-9, Markman v. Westview, 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
161. Appellant's Petition for Writ for Certiorari at 21, Markman v. Westview, 52 F.3d
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Petitioners.questioned the Federal Circuit's findings that judicial
determinations would enhance predictability .and that there is a
"complexity" exception to the Seventh Amendment.62 In refusing to
decide "the extent to which the Seventh Amendment can be said to
have crystallized a law/fact distinction, or whether post-1791
precedent classifying an issue as one of fact would. trigger the
protections of the Seventh Amendment,"'63 the Supreme Court has
failed to answer the question of whether Seventh Amendment
guarantees may actuallybe infringed as a result oftheir decision.
The Supreme Court has, given district court judges. the authority
to make voluminous factual determinations, even though the trier of
fact typically resolves such questions. The propriety of this authority
needs to be reconsidered in light of the ease and frequency with
which factual disputes will arise under the Pitney Bowes standard for
admissibility of extrinsic evidence. Additionally, patent cases are
indistinguishable from other civil actions acquiring the right to trial by
jury on all triable issue of fact, and Markman's denial of -jury




Although contradictory to the position taken by- the Supreme
Court, claim construction undeniably presents issues- of fact when
claim terms are disputed. Even if the Court chooses to reclassify these
issues as matters of law, the fact 'remains that evidence will be
presented in support of'the respective sides' arguments as to the true
meaning of the terms at the time an invention was patented. District
court judges will therefore be in a position to determine the
credibility of extrinsic evidence presented, to weigh the evidence, and
to draw logical inferences from 'the' presentations in an attempt to
logically fit the explanations within the actual claim language and the
associated patent documents. In carrying out these tasks, the district
court judges will be engaging in activities typically reserved for the
trier of fact.
Admittedly, if a judge is conducting a bench trial, there does not
967 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
162. Id. at 21-22 referring to Slocum v. New York Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364, 388
(1913) (holding that complexity of the facts does not determine the applicability of the
Seventh Amendment).
163. Markman, 517 U.S. at 384, n. 10.
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seem to be any harm in treating the disputed issues of fact as matters
of law. The judge will be making the final decision as to the outcome
of the infringement action and is best served by having a complete
understanding of the claims and the technology, which will be gained
through claim construction proceedings. Since the judge is the trier of
fact at a bench trial, triable issues of fact may properly be determined
at the claim construction or the trial phase.
If however, the trial will be held before a jury, issues of fact
should be presented to and determined by the jury. The jury should
ideally be educated through a joint technology tutorial. Ideally, the
tutorial could be incorporated into the claim construction and/or the
trial phase at which the jury is present. The jury should make the final
determination as to what meaning the disputed terms shall be given,
as these decisions are appropriately within their province as jurors.
Juries are capable of comprehending technological information, and
furthermore, some jurors may even have more technological
experience than presiding judges. Juries are relied upon to make
highly technical determinations in criminal cases and in other types of
civil litigation, and their abilities should not be questioned simply
because the issues presented revolve around patents.
It may also be acceptable, and not in violation of the right to a
jury trial, for one jury to determine the meaning of claim terms and
for another jury to sit at trial to determine whether the patent has
been infringed. The triable issues of fact raised in claim construction
may be just as properly determined by one trier of fact as another.
This option may not be in the interest of judicial economy, given the
time required for jury selection. However, the desire of many
attorneys to have claims construed before trial may make a dual jury
preferable. It would, however, be inappropriate for the judge to be
the trier of fact for purposes of claim construction, which would be
equivalent to the judge making determinations as matters of law.
If a jury trial has been requested, a jury, as a single or dual entity,
should be responsible for assessing the extrinsic evidence. The jury
should also have the opportunity to review the intrinsic evidence
associated with the patent, so that their construction does not conflict
with the patent documents.
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Conclusion
The Supreme Court's Markman decision demands reexamination
in light of the Federal Circuit's Pitney Bowes decision regarding the
admissibility of extrinsic evidence in claim construction proceedings.
It is questionable whether disputed issues of fact arising in claim
construction can properly be classified as matters of law, or whether
they are undeniably and indisputably issues of fact at their very
core." Claim construction intricately involves factual questions,
which must be presented to a jury in order to avoid a direct
contradiction with the Seventh Amendment guarantee to a jury trial
for resolution of such matters. On this basis, it is conceivable that
Markman erroneously removes the determination of such questions
from the province of the jury.165
By placing the judge in a position to make credibility
determinations, to weigh the evidence presented, and to draw
legitimate inferences from the facts, Markman extracts legitimate
factual determinations from the province of the jury."
It is notable that the Supreme Court, in certain instances, admits
that they authorize district court judges to take on tasks traditionally
reserved for the trier of fact. The Court plainly states that the
expertise of the judges, outweighs construction of the claims by the
jury "simply because the question is a subject of testimony requiring
credibility determinations, which are the jury's forte., 167 The Court
honestly doubts "that trial courts will run into many cases [in which
credibility determinations would have to be made about testifying
experts]" and assumes that "any credibility determinations [will] be
subsumed within the necessarily sophisticated analysis of the whole
document., 16 8 However, the district court judge in Markman, in
directing the verdict, "weighed the evidence [and] evaluated [its]
credibility."169 Nevertheless, the Court places the judges' "trained
ability to evaluate the testimony in relation to the overall structure of
164. Markman, 52 F.3d at 1010 (Newman, J., dissenting).
165. Id. at 1002-1011.
166. Id. at 1005 (Newman, J., dissenting).
167. Markman, 517 U.S. at 389.
168. Id. See also Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1463 ("The Supreme Court in Markman stated
that it would be a rare case in which claim construction would turn on an issue such as a
credibility judgment between two competing expert witnesses.").
169. Appellant's Petition for Writ for Certiorari at 5, Markman v. Westview, 52 F.3d
967 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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the patent" above all else.' The jury's capability to "evaluate
demeanor, to sense the 'mainsprings of human conduct,' or to reflect
community standards"'7' is not considered to be nearly as important.
To further complicate matters, whereas Vitronics limited the
potential use of extrinsic evidence, Pitney Bowes' standard for the use
of extrinsic evidence in claim construction has thrust district court
judges into the role of the trier of fact in cases where a jury has been
requested. 72 Pitney Bowes will make it increasingly more common for
judges to determine the credibility and weight to be given to extrinsic
evidence. Ultimately, Pitney Bowes will make it very difficult for the
Court to continue to argue that claim construction is a matter of law,
as judges are plainly engaging in extensive factual determinations.
The Supreme Court may not be able to escape reevaluation of
Markman and the extent to which its holding affects the guarantees
that the Seventh Amendment so generously, yet possibly vainly,
provides to civil litigants.
170. Markman, 517 U.S. at 389-90.
171. Duberstein, 363 U.S. at 289 cited in Markman, 517 U.S. at 389.
172. Pitney Bowes, 182 F.3d at 1309.
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